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Abstract 
The article presents a critical review of evolutionary and new growth theories. The 
purpose is to discuss the often-made claim that the two approaches, both inspired by 
Schumpeter’s seminal work, are becoming more and more similar in terms of the 
sources and mechanisms of the growth process on which they focus. According to this 
argument, some kind of theoretical convergence between the two paradigms is taking 
place. Differently from previous surveys of the field, the article compares evolutionary 
and new growth theories by focusing on their major theoretical foundations. The 
discussion leads to the conclusion that the two approaches greatly differ with respect to 
all of their main theoretical building blocks, and that no convergence between the two 
paradigms is therefore taking place. This finding should be welcomed by both 
evolutionary and new growth scholars, because it is the process of interaction and the 
fruitful exchange of ideas between different approaches that lead to advances in growth 
theory, not their convergence to a common paradigm. 
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1. Introduction 
The crucial role of innovation for economic growth has been increasingly recognised in 
the last two decades. Taking inspiration from the works of Schumpeter (1934, 1939 and 
1943), a surge of interest in the study of innovation and growth started at the beginning 
of 1980s with the seminal contributions in modern evolutionary economics (Dosi, 1982; 
Freeman et al., 1982; Nelson and Winter, 1982). The new wave of theorizing was 
motivated by the unsatisfaction with the stylized view of technological change 
presented by the Solow model (1956). Sharing a similar criticism, new growth theorists 
made a great effort to refine the Solovian view by building up models of innovation-
driven endogenous growth (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988; Aghion and Howitt, 1992). 
Evolutionary and new growth theories have rapidly developed in the last two decades. 
The great surge of interest in the new growth tradition, both in terms of formal 
endogenous models and of the related econometric work, is well-known, and there 
already exist various comprehensive surveys of the field (Temple, 1999; Islam, 2003; 
George, Oxley and Carlaw, 2004). The development of evolutionary economics has also 
been remarkable, and various critical discussions point to the strong similarities existing 
between the different strands of research within the evolutionary paradigm (Andersen, 
1994; Nelson, 1995; Archibugi and Michie, 1998; Nelson and Winter, 2002). 
Both evolutionary and new growth scholars have repeatedly recognised Schumpeter’s 
work as a major source of inspiration. Evolutionary scholars have frequently pointed to 
the strong connections between Schumpeter and modern evolutionary economics 
(Hodgson, 1997; Fagerberg, 2003). New growth theorists have also been invoking 
Schumpeter as their main source of inspiration. Endogenous growth models have 
increasingly incorporated some of the Schumpeterian ideas on the process of 
technological competition and innovation-based growth, with the consequence of 
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making the outcomes of the new growth models closer and closer to the ones of 
evolutionary models (Aghion and Howitt, 1998). 
This leads to some major questions: given that the Schumpeterian insights on the 
process of economic development constitute the main source of inspiration for both 
evolutionary and new growth theories, how similar are the two approaches? Can we 
observe theoretical convergence between the two, as it is often argued (Heertje, 1993; 
Romer, 1994; Ruttan, 1997; Sarkar, 1998) on the basis of the Schumpeterian flavour of 
both theories? These are the questions that this paper intends to answer. The paper 
carries out a critical survey of evolutionary and new growth theories with the purpose of 
analysing whether some kind of theoretical convergence is taking place between the two 
paradigms.  
The paper differs from previous critical surveys of the field in two main respects. First, 
the comparison between evolutionary and new growth theories will not simply be 
carried out by focusing on the formal growth models developed in the two traditions, 
but will also include other strands of empirically-oriented and non-formal studies. The 
latter constitute, in fact, an increasingly important part of growth theorizing, and 
provide inspiration and new insights for the development of modelling exercises. By 
enlarging the scope of the comparison, the paper will argue, it is possible to shed new 
ligths on the similarities and differences between the two theoretical paradigms.   
Secondly, the comparison will not be made in terms of the properties and results of 
evolutionary and new growth models, but it will analyse, at a more general level, the 
theoretical foundations of the two paradigms. By theoretical foundations we mean the 
theoretical characteristics that may be defined as the major building blocks of growth 
theorizing. The paper will consider six main theoretical foundations, and analyse them 
by discussing the following questions: 
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 (1) What is the main level of aggregation on which the theory focuses? 
(2) Is it based on the notion of representative agent or on the one of heterogeneous 
individuals? 
(3) What is the mechanism of creation of innovation and new variety? 
(4) What is the dynamics of the growth process? How is history conceived? 
(5) Is the growth process deterministic or unpredictable? 
(6) Does economic growth tend towards equilibrium, or is it a never ending process? 
 
Section 2 will present these six questions in further details, and it will define the main 
concepts used in the survey. Section 3 will use such theoretical questions as a 
framework to discuss the basic characteristics of the different streams of evolutionary 
economics developed in the last two decades, namely the neo-Schumpeterian long wave 
theory, the technology-gap approach, Nelson and Winter-like evolutionary theorizing, 
and the national innovation systems framework.1 In these evolutionary strands of 
theory, technological change is the main engine of economic growth, which is regarded 
as a complex process of transformation and qualitative change.2 The section will 
suggest that, to a large extent, these approaches share the same theoretical foundations, 
and may then be regarded as different strands of research within the same evolutionary 
paradigm. It will also point, though, to the existing tensions and formidable challenges 
currently faced by evolutionary economics. Section 4 will consider new growth theory 
by briefly looking at both, formal models and econometric works, and by discussing 
their theoretical foundations. Finally, section 5 will conclude the survey by pointing out 
the great differences still existing between evolutionary and new growth theories, and 
by claiming that no theoretical convergence is taking place between the two paradigms. 
 3
 2. The theoretical foundations for the study of innovation and growth 
This section presents the six theoretical questions that we will use to discuss and to 
compare evolutionary and new growth theories in the remaining of the paper. We 
believe that these six aspects constitute the major theoretical foundations for the study 
of innovation and growth, and thus represent the relevant characteristics that it is 
necessary to look at in order to compare different approaches. The section defines the 
main concepts used in the survey, and it briefly points to the origin of each concept in 
the history of economic thought. The reference to classical authors (e.g. Smith, Marx, 
Veblen, Schumpeter) will be brief and stylized, as the purpose is not to carry out an 
articulated discussion of the theoretical origins of modern theories of innovation and 
growth, but rather to define some important concepts and to introduce the analysis to be 
developed in the following sections.   
 
2.1 What is the main level of aggregation? 
A first important distinctive feature of theories of innovation and economic growth is 
the level of aggregation chosen as fundamental starting point to build up the theory. 
Three major positions may be distinguished in the history of economic thought:3
(i) Methodological individualism: this is the approach typical of classical and 
neoclassical economists, as well as Schumpeter.4 According to this, the aggregate 
properties of the economy must be studied by starting from the analysis of the 
microeconomic behavior of consumers and firms. The whole economic system must be 
analysed by looking at its component parts, the macroeconomic theory must necessarily 
be microfounded. 
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(ii) Methodological holism (Hodgson, 1993, p.238): this is the approach typical of Karl 
Marx, and later frequently adopted in economic sociology and heterodox 
macroeconomics. 5 Here, it is the social and macroeconomic structure to determine the 
behaviour of economic agents. The component parts of the economic system can only 
be studied by analysing the whole, the microeconomic element depends to a large extent 
on the macroeconomic structure. 
(iii) Non-reductionism: the previous two positions are both said to be ‘reductionist’, in 
that they only consider a one-way relationship between different levels of aggregation: 
either the micro determines the macroeconomic element, or the latter affects the former. 
An alternative to these reductionist views, not fully developed yet in modern economic 
theory, was proposed long ago by Veblen (1899 and 1919).6 He suggested that 
important interrelationships exist between the formation of individuals’ habits of 
thought and aggregate institutional regularities. In his view, the macroeconomic and 
social regularities are determined by the behaviour of individuals, but economic agents 
are in turn greatly affected by the macro structure in which they live. This temptative 
description of a co-evolution between different levels of analysis may be labelled ‘non-
reductionism’ (Hodgson, 1993, pp. 246-248), in that there does not exist a single 
dominant level of aggregation, but each level interacts with the others. As section 3 will 
point out, modern evolutionary economists frequently call for some form of non-
reductionism in the attempt to analyse the co-evolution across different levels of 
analysis (Dosi and Winter, 2000), although no significant advance in this respect has 
been obtained yet since the times of Veblen. 
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2.2 Representative agent or heterogeneous individuals? 
This question refers to the way in which (micro) economic agents are represented in the 
theoretical framework. In the history of economic thought, we may distinguish between 
some major different approaches: 
(i) Neoclassical typological thinking: this is the position adopted by neoclassical 
economics since the marginalist revolution, according to which economic agents can be 
studied by analysing the behaviour of a ‘representative agent’. In the simplest and most 
standard version of the neoclassical metaphor, the economic agent is typically described 
as a rational maximizer of utility/profits under given constraints and perfect 
information.  
(ii) Smithian typological thinking: according to Adam Smith and, later, Herbert Spencer 
economic agents are genetically similar and homogeneous, but the production process 
and the division of labour bring differentiation in skills and tasks because individuals 
learn ‘by doing’. Heterogeneity, in this case, is not a precondition but a consequence of 
the process of economic growth. It is not a genetic attribute of economic agents, but a 
characteristic acquired during their working life. 
(iii) Marxist typological thinking: Karl Marx pointed to the existence of a fundamental 
opposition between two different social classes, the capitalists and the proletarians. 
These two classes are defined in terms of their relationship to the means of production, 
and have permanently different interests and purposes. However, within each class, 
individuals are homogeneous. In other words, Marx implicitly assumes the existence of 
a duality between social classes at the macroeconomic level, but not heterogeneity of 
individuals at the microeconomic.  
(iv) Schumpeterian typological thinking: in Schumpeter (1934 and 1939), the 
microeconomic description of economic agents is rather peculiar. On the one hand, 
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there is a group of individuals, the entrepreneurs, genetically endowed with special 
psychological characteristics; they are the ones to determine the growth process, the real 
source of change. On the other hand, however, all the other economic agents are 
ordinary and indifferentiated individuals, not dissimilar from the representative agents 
of neoclassical theory, which react in a deterministic way to the changes of the process 
over time. This appears as an intermediate position between neoclassical typological 
thinking and evolutionary biology’s ‘population thinking’. 
(v) Veblen’s population thinking: heterogeneity of economic agents is an essential 
characteristic of an evolutionary approach to economic change, an early example being 
the work of Veblen (1899). Inspired by the developments of evolutionary biology, 
Veblen believed in the existence of a fundamental element of heterogeneity in 
individuals’ cognitive processes and in the formation of habits of thought, and originally 
pointed out that this variety is an important precondition for the process of economic 
growth and social change. Applying the biological metaphor to economics, ‘population 
thinking’ means that economic theory cannot ignore the heterogeneity in the population 
of economic agents, but must necessarily be built on that, as variety is the major source 
of novelty (innovation) in the process of economic development.7
 
2.3 What is the mechanism of creation of innovation and new variety? 
In modern theories of innovation and growth, the mechanism through which innovation 
and new variety are introduced in the economic system is the main source of economic 
growth, and it thus constitutes a key element in the theoretical framework. Referring to 
classical authors, we may briefly outline these different mechanisms of technical 
change:8
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(i) Manna from heaven: The neoclassical representative firm, in its simplest description, 
is assumed to have perfect and complete knowledge about the best technology available 
at any given time, and to always be able to adopt it. Technological knowledge is static, 
perfectly codifiable, and independent of the economic context and situation in which 
firms make their technological choices. All firms, then, can easily imitate and adopt 
advanced techniques used by more innovative firms. Knowledge is regarded as a public 
good, promptly available to all economic agents without further constraints. Technical 
change, in the most simplified version of the neoclassical metaphor, is exogenous and 
unexplained. 
 (ii) Learning by doing: this is the mechanism originally suggested by Adam Smith. The 
production process brings deeper division of labour and increasing specialization, and 
economic agents learn ‘by doing’ things and by producing goods during their working 
activities. Innovation, being a necessary consequence of the productive process, is 
therefore endogeneous, and mainly incremental and continuous. 
(iii) Labour saving technical change: this is the mechanism pointed out by Marx, 
according to which capitalists introduce labour saving technical innovations to decrease 
labour costs and to expand their profits. However, it remains unclear in the Marxian 
view how the new technology is invented, selected and adopted by capitalists.9 The real 
mechanism of technical change is then exogenous and unexplained. 
(iv) Schumpeterian innovation: Schumpeter was the first author to use a broad concept 
of innovation which encompassed technical as well as organizational changes, and to 
give it a central role in the explanation of economic development. Focusing on radical 
rather than incremental innovations, he put forward the idea that ‘new combinations’ are 
introduced by the entrepreneurs, which are individuals endowed with special 
psychological traits and creativity (Schumpeter, 1934). Later in his life, he suggested 
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that the innovative process is systematically organized and performed by R&D 
laboratories within large firms (Schumpeter, 1943), rather than introduced by creative 
entrepreneurs. 
(v) Veblen’s idle curiosity: Veblen suggests the existence of an important source of 
variety which continuously opposes to the inertial nature of habits of thought and 
institutions, namely the “human tendency towards experimentation and creative 
innovation” (Hodgson, 1993, p.127). Veblen called this tendency ‘idle curiosity’, and 
regarded it as a genetic human attitude that is a pre-condition for the process of growth, 
and not a consequence of it (as in Smith and Spencer). Veblen conceived ‘idle curiosity’ 
as analogous to mutations in Darwinian evolutionary biology, and thus as an ongoing 
and permanent source of change and renewed variety in the economic system. 
 
2.4 What is the dynamics of the growth process? How is history conceived? 
This characteristic refers to the type of dynamics of the growth process, and it is closely 
related to the way in which history is conceived in the theoretical framework. A brief 
look at the history of economic thought suggets that we may distinguish between some 
major different ways of conceiving economic dynamics: 
(i) Transitional dynamics: the focus of neoclassical theory is on the static allocation of 
resources at a given time, and dynamic analysis is conceived as an extension of the 
equilibrium metaphor to the long run. Economic dynamics is regarded as a process of 
transition towards a new state of equilibrium. History may therefore be thought of as a 
process of uniform-speed transitional dynamics towards long run equilibrium, rather 
than a process of irreversible and qualitative change. 
(ii) Increasing complexity: this is the position adopted by Adam Smith and Herbert 
Spencer, which were both deeply interested in issues of transformation and dynamics, 
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rather than resource allocation in a static context. They both argued that socio-economic 
change proceeds towards an increasing degree of specialization and complexity, and 
that it is a process of qualitative change. History was then conceived as a (uniform-
speed) gradual evolution towards higher states of complexity and differentiation. 
(iii) Revolutionary and dialectic dynamics: Marx conceived the dynamics of economic 
and social change as revolutionary, violent and disruptive. Growth is not a slow process 
of incremental and continuous change, but rather a discontinuous and radical jump from 
one stage of development to a better one. In his view, history may be conceived as the 
succession of different phases that proceed in a dialectic and revolutionary manner, until 
the final state of rest, communism, ultimately sets in. 
(iv) Saltationist dynamics: Schumpeter argued that “social phenomena constitute a 
unique process in historic time, and incessant and irreversible change is their most 
obvious characteristic” (Schumpeter, 1954, p.435). Such a definition of evolution points 
to the historical dependent unicity and irreversibility of the process of change, which is 
meant to be qualitative as well as quantitative change. According to him, evolution may 
be thought of “more like a series of explosions than a gentle, though incessant, 
transformation” (Schumpeter, 1939, p.102). This ‘saltationist’ characterization of the 
process of economic evolution is in many respects similar to Marx, and it is in sharp 
contrast with the more ‘gradualist’ character of other classical economists as well as 
neoclassical economics. 
(v) Gradualist evolutionary dynamics: gradual, continuous and incremental qualitative 
change is not only the characterizing element of Smith and Spencer, but also of the 
evolutionary theory of Veblen. According to him (Veblen, 1899 and 1919), the 
coexistence of forces driving towards change (‘idle curiosity’) and inertial forces (the 
persistence of ‘habits of thought’ and ‘institutions’) determines a process of gradual 
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evolution. History is an evolutionary process of qualitative change and cumulative 
causation. 
 
2.5 Is the growth process deterministic or unpredictable? 
Another important feature in economic growth theorizing is whether the process 
described is deterministic and predictable, or rather non-deterministic and 
unpredictable. Although many intermediate positions could be discussed, it is useful to 
point out the two major (opposite) views. 
(i) Mechanistic, deterministic and predictable process: the economic world is 
understood and represented in terms of cause-effect mechanisms, in which there is no 
space for purposeful behaviour and free choice. Inspired by the developments of 
classical physics and astronomy, the mechanistic view in economics has been dominant 
since the time of classical economists (including Marx), marginalist and neoclassical 
economics. The mechanistic view implies that, given the initial conditions at the present 
time and the law of motion of the economic system, any future state can be perfectly 
foreseen. Mechanicism, therefore, implies determinism and predictability of future 
economic outcomes.10
(ii) Non-mechanistic, non-deterministic and unpredictable process: the mechanistic 
metaphor, according to a different view, is not appropriate to describe the evolution of a 
complex system. Purposeful behaviour, deliberate choice and creativity of individuals 
introduce a fundamental element of non-mechanicism and unpredictability in the 
economic world. This is the view adopted, more or less explicitly, by German 
Historicists, Old American Institutionalists (e.g. Veblen), and to a certain extent by 
Schumpeter. In this view, the process of innovation and economic growth is 
characterized by genuine and pervasive uncertainty, rather than mere computable risk. 
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This distinction was originally put forward by Knight (1921), according to which “the 
practical difference between the two categories, risk and uncertainty, is that in the 
former the distribution of the outcome in a group of instances is known (either through 
calculation a priori or from statistics of past experience), while in the case of 
uncertainty this is not true, the reason being in general that it is impossible to form a 
group of instances, because the situation dealt with is in a high degree unique” (Knight, 
1921, III.VIII.2). In an economic world characterized by radical uncertainty, rather than 
computable risk, given the initial conditions at the present state, it is not possible to 
predict with certainty what the future state of the economic system will be. The 
economic process is non-deterministic and fundamentally unpredictable. 
 
2.6 Towards equilibrium or never ending? 
Where does the economic process lead to? Does it tend towards a final state of long run 
equilibrium, or does it change continuously and go on moving forever without any 
definite final point? By and large, it is possible to point out two main different views on 
this fundamental characteristic of economic theory: 
(i) Towards equilibrium: the process of economic growth tends towards a final state of 
rest, equilibrium, and greater economic welfare. This was the view adopted, in different 
forms, by Adam Smith and Herbert Spencer, as well as Marx (for which ‘communism’ 
is a final state of rest in which all conflicts and dualisms ultimately cease). The 
equilibrium view became more explicitly dominant in economics after the marginalist 
revolution, since the last decades of the nineteenth century. More recently, the 
neoclassical theory of growth (e.g. Solow, 1956) extended the static concept of 
equilibrium to the analysis of the dynamics of the long period, by assuming the 
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existence of a ‘steady state’ towards which the economic system will tend in the long 
run. 
(ii) Never ending process: the equilibrium view has frequently been criticized outside of 
the economic mainstream. Economic growth, it has been argued, is a never ending and 
ever changing process, it does not tend towards a steady state of balanced growth. This 
is the view expressed in the past, among others, by German Historicists, Schumpeter 
and Veblen. Using the latter’s words, economic evolution is “a continuity of cause and 
effect. It is a scheme of blindly cumulative causation, in which there is no trend, no final 
term, no consummation […], a theory of the process of consecutive change, realized to 
be self-continuing or self-propagating and to have no final term” (Veblen, 1919, pp. 36-
37). 
 
 
3. Evolutionary growth theorizing 
After having defined the main concepts that will be used in this survey, we will now 
discuss the major strands of research within modern evolutionary economics. This 
section will consider in turn the main approaches, namely the neo-Schumpeterian long 
wave theory, the technology-gap approach, Nelson and Winter-like evolutionary 
theorizing, and the National Innovation Systems framework. Each subsection is 
composed of two parts: the first presents a brief overview of the approach, while the 
second part analyses its theoretical foundations by answering the six questions 
presented in section 2. The discussion will point out that these four approaches share, to 
a large extent, the same theoretical foundations, so that they may be conceived as 
different strands of research within the evolutionary economic paradigm. The analysis 
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will also argue, though, that although important advances have been realized in 
evolutionary economics in the last two decades, there still exist great challenges ahead.   
 
3.1 Neo-Schumpeterian long wave theory 
The neo-Schumpeterian approach to economic growth takes great inspiration from 
Shumpeter’s book Business Cycles (1939), in which the author put forward a theory 
about the existence of long waves of economic growth. His original point was to focus 
on the importance of basic (radical) innovations in creating such long waves, because, 
he argued, they have potentially a deep impact on the whole economy. The 
Schumpeterian insights on the central role of radical innovations in the macroeconomic 
growth process did not affect significantly the development of economic thought in the 
following four decades. Since the mid 1970s, however, there started to be greater 
criticism on the way in which mainstream economics approached the relationships 
between technical change and economic growth, and a renewed interest in the central 
role of innovation as the majour source of economic growth. 
The debate started with Kuznets' (1940) review of Schumpeter's Business Cycles 
(1939). His long wave theory, Kuznets argued, did not explain neither the reasons for 
the timing of occurrence of basic innovations in the depression phase of the wave, nor 
why they tend to cluster over time. Mensch (1979) put forward the idea that radical 
innovations tend to cluster in the depression phase of the long wave because this is the 
time in which the lag between invention and innovation is shortened (so-called 
‘depression-trigger hypothesis’). A rich empirically oriented literature (among others 
Kleinknecht, 1981; Van Dujin, 1983) focused on the timing of clustering of basic 
innovations. The empirical results of these works have been heavily debated. On the 
whole, as pointed out by Freeman, Clark and Soete (1982), the empirical evidence on 
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the clustering of basic innovations in the depression phase of the wave is rather weak 
and not conclusive. 
After this empirical debate, a second stream of neo-Schumpterian literature flourished 
during the 1980s, providing a number of concepts and ideas useful to give a stronger 
theoretical foundation to long wave theory. These more conceptually oriented 
contributions started with the publication of the book Unemployment and Technical 
Innovation (Freeman, et al., 1982), and was followed by the works of Freeman (1983, 
1984 and 1987), Perez (1983, 1985), and Freeman and Louca (2001).  
As Perez (1983) points out, the Schumpeterian process of development “unfolds within 
the economic sphere conceived as a self-regulating organism which provokes its own 
disturbances (innovations) and absorbs its impacts by constantly striving towards new 
higher equilibria”. The social conditions and institutional framework are excluded from 
the causation mechanism that drives the primary cycle. This is the reason why she 
argues that “Schumpeter does lay the foundations for a theory of the cyclical nature of 
the capitalist economy but not of long waves” (Perez, 1983, p.359). Based on these 
considerations, neo-Schumpeterian scholars conceive the capitalist system as formed by 
two related sub-systems: the techno-economic and the socio-institutional. It is the joint 
evolution of these sub-systems to determine the ‘mode of development’, and 
consequently the rise and fall of long waves.  
According to this view, it is not important when a set of basic innovations is introduced, 
but rather that these radical innovations are strictly interrelated and pervasive, i.e. that 
they may drive the growth of many fast growing sectors of the economy. Such a family 
of interrelated basic innovations may be called ‘technological system’ (Freeman et al., 
1982), ‘technological paradigm’ (Dosi, 1982), or ‘technological style’ (Perez, 1983). 
This concept is arguably quite similar to that of ‘general purpose technologies’, 
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although the latter is more frequently used in new growth theories (see section 4). When 
a new technological style arises, there is a big impulse in the techno-economic sub-
system to adopt the new best practice technology with high profit prospects. However, 
the techno-economic system is more ready to accept and adopt changes, while the socio-
institutional one may take a longer time before making the changes required by the new 
technological style. The mismatch between the two sub-systems may retard the large-
scale introduction of the new paradigm, precisely because social, organizational and 
institutional changes are necessary before it can diffuse to the whole economy. As the 
socio-institutional system evolves, the ‘harmonic complementarity’ between the two 
systems gradually restores, and a new mode of development eventually sets in. This 
may determine a long wave pattern similar to the primary cycle described by 
Schumpeter (1939): rapid diffusion of the new paradigm, incremental innovations over 
its ‘natural trajectory’ (Nelson and Winter, 1977), creative destruction, and 
consequently the upswing and prosperity phases of the long wave. Later on, increased 
competition and market saturation, decreasing revenues from the new technologies and 
decline of profits, which characterize the recession and depression phases of the long 
wave.  
 
3.1.1 Discussion  
The first question that our critical review considers refers to the level of aggregation of 
the approach. In this respect, neo-Schumpeterian long wave theory is a macroeconomic 
approach to the study of innovation and growth, the focus of the analysis being the 
evolution of a country (or a group of countries) over time. Great attention is devoted to 
the study of sectoral differences, focusing in particular on more technologically 
advanced and fast-growing sectors, which are those that drive the overall growth of the 
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economy. The sectoral analysis, though, is primarily carried out with the purpose of 
understanding the implications and effects of sectoral patterns on national and 
international macroeconomic growth. Differently from Schumpeter, then, neo-
Schumpeterian theory is not explicitly microfounded. It shows that the main features of 
Schumpeterian macroeconomics can be obtained without necessarily following 
methodological individualism.  
Consequently, as there is no description of the microeconomic level, the notions of 
heterogeneity and population thinking are not explicitly considered in this approach. 
However, the fundamental role of heterogeneity and, more in general, the evolutionary 
foundation of such an approach, are increasingly recognized by recent long wave 
studies (Freeman and Louca, 2001). An evolutionary type of modelling in which the 
interactions of heterogeneous agents determine long wave patterns has already been 
proposed in the works of Iwai (1984) and Silverberg and Lehnert (1994). The future 
extension of this class of models could make the evolutionary foundation of neo-
Schumpeterian studies more explicit than it is at the present stage. 
Similarly to all the other theoretical frameworks considered in this paper, innovation is 
the main source of economic growth. The historical and institutional context in which 
technical and organizational innovations take place is considered with great accuracy in 
neo-Shumpeterian works. On the one hand, the innovative process is exogenous, 
because it depends on the science and technology system, which is pointed out as 
important but not explicitly investigated. On the other hand, though, innovation is an 
endogenous activity, determined by R&D investments of firms and, in a later phase of 
the long wave, linked to demand and production growth through learning by doing, 
dynamic economies of scale, and embodied technical progress. 
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Innovation is arguably the majour source of economic growth in this framework, but 
this does not justify the often-made claim that neo-Schumpeterian long wave theory is a 
technological deterministic approach. Such a criticism is based on the fact that when a 
new technological paradigm emerges, it is the evolution of the techno-economic system 
to determine the socio-institutional characteristics that are required to compete in the 
new long wave period. So, transformations in the techno-economic system affect greatly 
the characteristics of the new mode of development. However, in the downswing phase 
of the long wave, innovations are more likely to be introduced in the market because 
firms and consumers are more willing to risk and to try out new solutions. It is in the 
downswing phase that consumers’ expectations, firms’ animal spirits, and social and 
political changes facilitate the introduction and diffusion of a new technological 
paradigm. Therefore, changes in the socio-institutional system may also affect the 
techno-economic, so that it is not appropriate to argue that neo-Schumpeterian long 
wave theory is based on a simple one-sided and technological deterministic view of the 
process of economic change. 
The creation and diffusion of interrelated innovations determine long waves of 
economic growth, each characterized by an initial speed up (upswing) and then a 
slowing down phase (downswing). The dynamics of the process is saltationist, 
disruptive, irregular, and characterized by structural and irreversible change, as in 
Schumpeter’s view. Precise regularity and strict periodicity are not assumed in long 
wave theory, the process repeats itself over time but in a rather irregular way (Freeman 
et al., 1982). According to this interpretation of history, the recurrence of long waves 
does not imply that the waves are all the same. The only recurrent mechanism is the co-
evolution between technological and socio-institutional changes and its importance for 
economic growth, but the precise form that they take in each historical phase is ever 
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changing and always different. Every occurrence is singular and unique in historical 
time. 
A common criticism made to the long wave approach refers to its ‘mechanistic’ flavour. 
On the one hand, it is true that, once a new technological paradigm emerges, the long 
wave process is assumed to follow in a more or less automatic and mechanistic way, 
closely resembling the Schumpeterian primary cycle. On the other hand, however, in the 
downswing phase it is not possible to predict which technological and organisational 
innovations will characterize the following historical phase, and when they will come 
about. The outcomes of the science and technology system are non predictable with 
accuracy, and the same is true for the socio-institutional changes that will follow. 
Considering the whole long wave sequence, then, the process described may certainly 
be regarded as non-deterministic and non-predictable.  
Finally, with respect to the sixth theoretical question that we consider in our discussion, 
it should be observed that the neo-Schumpeterian process of growth is ever-changing 
and never-ending, it does not tend towards the steady state. Similarly to Schumpeter, the 
economic system is never in equilibrium, there are always forces determining further 
disequilibrating movements. It is innovation that continuously breaks the circular flow 
of economic activity, and that determines the inherent disequilibrium nature of the 
economic system. 
 
3.2 The technology-gap approach 
While neo-Schumpeterian scholars study the process of economic development within 
each country, technology-gap theorists focus on technological and economic differences 
between countries. The approach has originated from the contributions of historically 
oriented economists, which investigated the process of catching up and overtaking of 
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some advanced (leader) countries in the last two centuries by focusing on the creation of 
new technologies and on its international diffusion (Veblen, 1915; Gerschenkron, 1962; 
Habakkuk, 1962; Landes, 1969; Abramovitz, 1986 and 1994, Freeman, 1987). These 
historical contributions, different as they may be, all point out that two broad sets of 
factors are necessary for succesful catching-up and rapid growth in the long run: techno-
economic and socio-institutional factors. The crucial point is thus that catching up is a 
complex process, so that its investigation cannot only look at economic factors, but also 
at the important technological, social and institutional aspects related to the 
development process.11
Originating from these historically oriented studies, a modern strand of technology-gap 
theory has developed since the 1980s. These more quantitative-oriented applied studies 
aim at explaining the historical evidence on catching up by adopting a Schumpeterian 
perspective on the importance of innovation and international diffusion for economic 
growth.  The Schumpeterian idea that firms compete in the market by upgrading their 
technological capabilities is then applied to the macroeconomic level, where countries 
are assumed to compete for the economic leadership through their technological 
capabilities, absorptive capacities and innovating activities. Econometric works in this 
tradition typically investigate differences in economic growth rates and trade 
performances by using indicators of national technological activities, such as R&D and 
patent statistics. The strong correlation generally found between technological and 
macroeconomic performance (e.g. Fagerberg, 1987 and 1988; Dosi, Pavitt and Soete, 
1990) is then taken as an indication of the fundamental role played by the creation and 
diffusion of technologically advanced products and processes for explaining growth rate 
differences. 
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These econometric studies investigate differences in technological and economic 
performances on large samples of advanced and middle-income countries, so that, 
compared to the previous historically oriented contributions, the focus shifts from the 
study of the catching up process of single countries to the analysis of convergence and 
divergence in the whole sample of countries, carried out through statistical and 
econometric techniques. The cross-country econometric methodology is thus 
remarkably similar to that used in the convergence literature in mainstream economics 
(see section 4). 
The theoretical perspective that underlies the applied work in the evolutionary 
technology-gap tradition, however, is quite different from its neoclassical counterpart. 
As developed by Cornwall (1977), Abramovitz (1986 and 1994), Fagerberg (1987, 1988 
and 1994) and Verspagen (1991 and 1993), the modern technology-gap approach to 
economic growth assumes that innovation and the international diffusion of new 
technologies are the main sources of differences in growth rates between countries. 
Follower countries have a technology-gap (or technological distance) that separates 
them from the leader country, and they can therefore try to exploit their backward 
position by imitating and using advanced technologies developed by the leader country, 
instead of creating them from scratch. The process of imitation and diffusion of new 
technologies is costly, though, and it requires the existence of social and institutional 
capabilities that not all the follower countries have (Archibugi and Michie, 1998). This 
explains why catching up and convergence are not automatic and common outcomes.  
Considering the conditions that are necessary for successful imitation and catching up, 
two broad sets of factors have been stressed. First, following Abramovitz (1994, p.24), 
it is important to consider the ‘technological congruence’ of a country. This is defined 
by various factors: (i) the ‘technological interrelatedness’, i.e. how much a country is 
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committed to the old technological paradigm, and therefore how difficult is to make the 
jump into the emerging one; (ii) the country’s natural resources and factors endowment; 
(iii) consumers’ demand and tastes; (iv) market size and scale; (v) transportation and 
infrastructure; (vi) facilities for structural change, i.e. how rapidly the economic system 
is able to shift resources from the old to the new paradigm; (vii) general macroeconomic 
conditions and the rate of growth of demand. Second, turning to the broad set of social, 
cultural and institutional factors, Abramovitz (1994, p.25) defines the ‘social capability’ 
of a country, characterized by: (i) its level of education and technical competence; (ii) 
skills of the entrepreneurial class; (iii) commercial, industrial and financial institutions; 
(iv) political and social characteristics that influence the risks and incentives of 
economic activity; (v) science-technology links in firms and public research centres.  
Considering them together, techno-economic congruence and social capability differ 
between countries in each technological paradigm, and these structural differences may 
explain why some countries manage to succesfully catch up with the technological 
leader, while some others fall behind. The major difference between this theoretical 
perspective and technology-gap models in the neoclassical tradition (or North-South 
models, see Chui et al., 2002) is that the evolutionary view stresses the importance of 
the social and institutional structure to determine the social capability of a country 
(Abramovitz, 1986) and its ability to imitate foreign technologies. 
 
3.2.1 Discussion  
Similarly to the neo-Schumpeterian long wave theory previously discussed, the 
technology-gap approach is a macroeconomic approach. Applied works in this tradition 
are not based on the concept of aggregate production function, and the approach is 
therefore not explicitly microfounded, as there is no description of the behaviour of 
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economic agents that may determine the aggregate outcomes. The Schumpeterian 
insights on innovation, diffusion and technological competition are transferred from the 
individual to the aggregate level of analysis: such as firms compete in the market for 
their market shares and profits, countries compete in the international arena for the 
technological and economic leadership. The main unit of analysis, then, is the country 
(some recent works focus on the regional level instead; see Fagerberg and Verspagen, 
1996; Cappelen et al., 2003). 
As the approach is not microfounded, heterogeneity of individuals and population 
thinking are not explicitly considered in this framework. It is argued that countries are 
fundamentally and structurally different, particularly from a social and institutional 
point of view, but this variety at the macroeconomic level is assumed, and not explained 
by focusing on the interactions in a population of heterogeneous agents. Some formal 
evolutionary models (Dosi and Fabiani, 1994; Dosi et al., 1994), however, show that the 
interactions of heterogeneous agents in an evolutionary framework may generate 
situations of catching up and falling behind, and reproduce the empirical patterns of 
convergence and divergence that applied studies have found. More work of this kind is 
needed in the future. The study of the aggregate properties of microfounded 
evolutionary models is a fascinating challenge for future research in this field, and it 
may provide a bridge between the applied work in the technology-gap tradition with the 
formal analysis of Nelson and Winter-like evolutionary models (discussed in section 3.3 
below). 
Technological change is the main source of economic growth, but its mechanism, rate 
and direction are not investigated. Although innovation and diffusion of technologies 
are conceived as fundamental conditions for catching up, the way in which they are 
introduced in the economic system is not analysed further. The focus is on the structural 
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and institutional factors that may facilitate or hamper the process of international 
diffusion, but not on the factors that may explain a differential rate of creation of 
innovations in different countries. The approach does not shed any new light in this 
respect. 
The dynamics implicitly assumed in technology-gap studies is mainly saltationist. The 
approach argues in fact that when a new technological paradigm sets in, there is a strong 
technological push in the economic system, which may turn to have important 
consequences for the patterns of convergence/divergence. In times of radical changes, 
leader countries can more easily invest in the new technologies, and are therefore likely 
to grow faster than follower countries, so that greater divergence between rich and poor 
countries may follow. After some decades, when catching-up countries start to imitate 
and use the new technologies in large scale, convergence in the whole sample may be a 
more common result. So, the dynamics of convergence/divergence between countries 
does not proceed at uniform speed, but it rather follows the paradigmatic, saltationist 
and discontinuous character of technological change.  
Moreover, the process of catching-up and falling behind is conceived as non-
deterministic and non-predictable. The reason is that as technological change is 
fundamentally an uncertain phenomenon, it is not possible to predict which new 
technological system will prevail in the future. Therefore, it is hard to predict with 
accuracy the countries that will be more likely to catch-up in the future, and those that 
will fall behind. The applied works in this tradition show the changing character of the 
catching up and convergence process over time. The more recent evidence points out 
that, while it was relatively easier to imitate and import foreign technologies in the age 
of Fordism and mass production, the scope for catching up has significantly decreased 
in the last two decades. The catching up process of follower countries requires now a 
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greater effort for the creation and improvement of national technological capabilities 
(Fagerberg and Verspagen, 2002). The technology-gap process of growth is then ever-
changing and never-ending, it is a process of qualitative change and transformation, 
rather than a transition towards the steady state.  
 
3.3 Nelson and Winter-like evolutionary theorizing 
The possible use of the biological-evolution metaphor in economic science was 
originally suggested by Veblen and Marshall more than a century ago, but the 
development of modern evolutionary economics is relatively recent, tracing back to 
Nelson and Winter’s (1982) book An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. Nelson 
and Winter-like evolutionary theorizing is currently the most influential and rapidly 
developing branch in the evolutionary economic paradigm.  
Three complementary streams of literature have recently extended in various directions 
Nelson and Winter’s theory of economic change: (i) microeconomic evolutionary theory 
of consumers, firms and organizations, closely connected to cognitive psychology, 
business and organizational studies;12 (ii) sectoral studies on the historical evolution of 
particular industries, and related analyses of industrial dynamics and sectoral systems of 
innovation;13 (iii) formal models of economic growth.14 Although the three streams 
focus on different aspects of the evolutionary process at various levels of aggregation 
(firms, sectors and countries, respectively), they all conceive economic evolution as 
driven by the interactions between heterogeneity, selection and innovation processes. 
Figure 1 shows a simplified scheme of these interactions.  
Heterogeneity (or variety) of economic agents is a fundamental feature of the 
evolutionary economic world. The latter is characterized by complex evolving 
knowledge, bounded rational agents and radical uncertainty. In such an uncertain world, 
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individuals follow routines and habits of thought in their economic activities. Routines 
are regarded as the counterpart of genes in biological evolution. The reason for this 
analogy is threefold: routines are embodied in the minds and production activities of 
economic agents; they greatly differ among the various units of the population; and they 
can be transmitted from one individual to another, so that they may take account of the 
regularities sustaining stable and inertial patterns of production over time.  
Within the same firm, production can be conceived as guided by routines at different 
levels, driving the standard operating procedures, the investment behaviour, and the 
deliberate search for new routines or solutions when the old ones prove to give 
unsatisfactory results in terms of market shares and profits. Routine-guided firms may 
thus be thought of as the counterpart of phenotypes in biological evolution, because 
their behaviour is the result of the interactions of their genetic endowment (individual 
skills and organizational routines) with a given economic and institutional environment.  
Since Nelson and Winter (1982)’s seminal work, several evolutionary models of 
economic growth have tried to formalize this idea of routine-guided heterogeneous 
firms within a disequilibrium framework. These models assume that firms differ with 
regards to the techniques that they use (Iwai, 1984; Conlisk, 1989; Silverberg and 
Lehnert, 1994), their behaviours and strategies (Chiaromonte and Dosi, 1993; Dosi et 
al., 1994; Fagiolo and Dosi, 2003; Silverberg and Verspagen, 1994a; 1994b; 1996), or 
the characteristics of the sectors in which they operate (Winter, 1984; Verspagen, 1993).  
Evolutionary analytical models, therefore, aim at reproducing the idea that the 
‘routinized’ character of the productive process carried out by a population of 
heterogeneous firms may generate a relatively stable pattern of economic activities and 
relationships over time. The important point, however, is that such inertial forces and 
inherent persistency are continuously counteracted by dynamic forces that push the 
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economic system towards evolution, change and transformation. These dynamic forces 
are technological competition and selection, on the one hand, and innovation on the 
other. 
In the same way as animal species compete for their survival in the natural environment, 
heterogeneous firms compete in the market by trying to employ more advanced 
techniques, and to produce at lower costs and better quality than their competitors. The 
selection mechanism in evolutionary models typically depends on the profits realized by 
each firm. Firms that are able to obtain high profits increase their market shares; firms 
with inferior technological capabilities realize lower profits, loose market shares, and 
will ultimately be driven out of the market. The idea of selection-based growth, put 
forward in different forms in the past by Schumpeter (1939), Alchian (1951) and Winter 
(1964 and 1971), is usually represented in recent formal models through the use of 
replicator (or Lotka-Volterra) equations in which the firm’s market share (or production 
level) is assumed to evolve over time as a function of its technological capability and 
profitability. 
An important qualification, made by the growing number of studies of sectoral patterns 
of innovation (Pavitt, 1984; Malerba, 2002), is that the competition-selection process 
works differently in different industries of the economy. Each sector is characterized by 
the complex interactions between heterogeneous agents, economic structure, institutions 
and technological characteristics. The latter, in particular, determine the ‘technological 
regime’ in which competition and selection take place. The technological regime may 
be conceived as the technological environment in which innovative activities take place 
in different industries of the economy. Such an environment differs in terms of 
technological opportunities, properties of the knowledge base, cumulativeness and 
appropriability conditions. Formal models and econometric evidence show that the 
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characteristics defining technological regimes may generate the different patterns of 
industrial dynamics originally identified by Schumpeter (i.e. the so-called Schumpeter 
Mark I and II; see Winter, 1984 and Malerba, 2005).  
Over time, competition and selection tend to consume and to reduce the initial 
heterogeneity. Without the creation of new variety, the process of evolution would soon 
come to an end. The fundamental point about the evolutionary economic world is 
precisely that there is an ongoing introduction of novelty, so that heterogeneity and 
variety are continuously renewed, and evolution is a never-ending process. In particular, 
two main different sources of novelty have been stressed in the literature. The first is a 
kind of ‘unintended’ innovation, that arises when new routines are created as an 
automatic and non-deliberate consequence of routinized production within firms. This is 
for example the case when the firm expands its production scale by hiring additional 
workers or buying new machines. The additional workers and equipments can never 
exactly replicate what the old were doing, so that a firm’s routines can be randomly 
modified at any time (Nelson and Winter, 1982, ch. 5). Moreover, the old routines 
applied to a larger scale can be improved simply because workers learn by doing and by 
producing. Dynamic economies of scale assume then an important role in an 
evolutionary environment, as it is for example the case in the model by Silverberg, Dosi 
and Orsenigo (1988). 
A second important source of novelty comes from a deliberate search for new technical 
solutions whenever the old one does not lead to efficient outcomes and satisficing 
profits. Nelson and Winter (1982)’s formal model assume that when the profit rate falls 
below a certain threshold, the firm will engage in a process of search for a better 
technique by imitating other firms or by creating innovation. Winter (1984) and 
Malerba (2002) point out that the probability that a firm chooses to imitate or to 
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innovate depends on the characteristics of the technological regime in which it operates, 
and in particular on the possibility to appropriate the innovation profits, which 
determines the technological spillovers that is possible to exploit in a given sector of the 
economy. A later class of evolutionary models (Silverberg and Verspagen, 1994a; 
1994b; 1995; 1996), has introduced the idea that firms may change their strategies and 
routines by learning from past experience, so that evolution does not only imply 
technological change but behavioural learning as well. 
In a nutshell, evolutionary economic theory explains growth in terms of the dynamic 
interactions between heterogeneity, competition, selection, and innovation, where the 
latter leads to renewed heterogeneity and thus to perpetuate the growth process. From a 
theoretical point of view, the evolutionary description of the economic world appears as 
a novel contribution to growth theory. Its empirical relevance, though, is still difficult to 
evaluate, and the relationship between formal models and econometric work in this 
tradition has not been made explicit yet. In particular, what kind of empirical stylized 
facts may be generated as outcomes of evolutionary models?  
Although evolutionary economics has not yet agreed on a standard set of assumptions 
and results, important empirical trends have been generated as ‘emergent properties’ of 
different classes of evolutionary models, i.e.: (i) structural change and creative 
destruction (like in the studies of industrial dynamics, history-friendly models and 
recent studies on ‘sectoral systems of innovation’, see Malerba, 2005); (ii) path-
dependency (in models where the coexistence of random events and increasing returns 
may generate path dependent phenomena of the kind described by David, 1985, and 
Arthur, 1994); (iii) long waves and fluctuations without fixed periodicity (Silverberg 
and Lehnert, 1994; Silverberg and Verspagen, 1994a; 1994b; 1995; 1996), reproducing 
the predictions of the neo-Schumpeterian literature discussed in sec. 3.1; (iv) 
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endogenous specialization patterns and uneven international trade (e.g. Verspagen, 
1993); (v) patterns of convergence/divergence between countries at the macroeconomic 
level (Dosi et al., 1994; Chiaromonte and Dosi, 1993), closely related to the predictions 
of the technology-gap approach discussed in sec. 3.2. The examples above indicate that 
an important future challenge for Nelson and Winter-like evolutionary modelling is to 
reach a closer link between formal models and econometric studies, as this may also 
provide a more explicit bridge with the other evolutionary traditions considered in this 
paper. 
 
3.3.1 Discussion  
Evolutionary models are explicitly microfounded on a population of heterogeneous 
agents (population thinking). The theory is bottom-up built, it considers necessary to 
start from the microeconomic level to derive the macroeconomic implications. 
Aggregate phenomena are defined as ‘emergent properties’, i.e. “the collective and 
largely unintentional outcome of far-from-equilibrium micro interactions” (Dosi and 
Winter, 2000, p. 5). Individuals’ skills and firms’ routines are the basic units of 
microeconomic analysis. However, the way in which routines and habits of thought of 
economic agents may in turn be shaped and affected by the macroeconomic and 
institutional environment in which they operate has not been made explicit yet. A co-
evolution across different levels of analysis is in fact often called for, but not 
systematically introduced yet in evolutionary modelling. Arguably, future evolutionary 
models may assume the same non-reductionist character as verbal and non-
mathematical studies of evolutionary economic change. Non-reductionism appears 
therefore as an important challenge for future research in evolutionary economics. 
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The population of heterogeneous firms is analyzed in terms of the interactions between 
variety, competition, selection and innovation. The latter is the fundamental source of 
renewed variety and economic growth, without which evolution would ultimately cease. 
Novelty can take the form of unintended and automatic consequence of the routinized 
production, or of deliberate search by firms for new technologies (through innovation 
and imitation). In both cases, the focus of evolutionary modelling is on an incremental 
type of innovation, while Schumpeterian radical innovations have not yet found a 
decisive role in this strand of research. 
As a consequence, the dynamics of the economic system is prevailing gradualist, 
characterized by slow and continuous change and transformation, rather than drastic 
jumps as in the case of neo-Schumpeterian and technology-gap approaches. History 
may be conceived as an evolutionary process of gradual and continuous growth and 
qualitative change, which does not necessarily pass through the succession of different 
paradigmatic phases. The focus on routinized production and routine-guided innovation 
gives the theory a bias towards continuity and gradual evolution, in which radical 
technical and institutional changes can hardly emerge from the inertial quality of 
routines and habits of thought. 
Similarly to the other evolutionary strands of research, economic growth is seen as a 
non-predictable process, because fundamental sources of uncertainty exist in the 
economic system. In particular, uncertain and non-deterministic innovative activity is 
represented in formal models by assuming that the arrival rate of innovation follows a 
stochastic process (e.g. a Poisson random variable). This formalization, though, appears 
more suitable to represent an economic environment characterized by computable risk 
rather than the strong and pervasive uncertainty of the evolutionary world. 
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The coexistence of random and systematic factors driving economic evolution (Nelson, 
1995; Verspagen, 2005), together with the coexistence of inertial and dynamic forces, 
determine the outcomes of the models: structural change, path-dependency, aggregate 
growth, endogenous specialization patterns, and convergence/divergence across 
countries. All of these phenomena are explained as the result of far-from-equilibrium 
micro interactions. Differently from the neoclassical metaphor of a steady state, then, 
evolutionary economics theorizes an ever-changing and never-ending process of growth 
and transformation. 
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Figure 1. Main relationships in Nelson and Winter-like evolutionary economics 
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3.4 The national innovation systems framework 
The previous sections have already made clear that the heart of evolutionary growth 
theorizing is the investigation of the innovative process. Many feedbacks and complex 
interactions are involved in the creation of technical and organizational innovations, 
between individuals within the same firm, between different firms, between producers 
and users of the new technology, between public and private organizations. Towards the 
end of the 1980s, it was increasingly recognised that such complex links could not be 
studied within a linear framework, and a ‘systemic’ approach to the study of innovation 
was developed. 
Freeman (1987) was the first to use a systemic perspective in his national case study on 
Japan. The national innovation system (NIS) (defined as “the network of institutions in 
the public and private sectors whose activities and interactions initiate, modify and 
diffuse new technologies”, Freeman, 1987, p.1), he argued, is arguably the most 
important factor behind the spectacular economic performance of Japan after World 
War II. From his neo-Schumpeterian perspective, Freeman conceived the national 
innovation system as a subset of the ‘socio-institutional’ one. The case of Japan showed 
how important it is for a country to have an active and well-organized innovation 
system. 
Conceiving the innovation system in a more narrow way than Freeman, Porter (1990) 
studied the factors behind the different economic performance of ten industrialized 
countries. He argued that innovative activities greatly vary in firms of different 
countries for the existence of differences in the following aspects: (i) factor and 
resource conditions, including natural resources as well as labor; (ii) demand conditions; 
(iii) related and supporting industries; (iv) firms’ strategies and industry structure. These 
four elements must be considered together, as a part of an interactive whole. The focus 
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of Porter’s analysis is the innovative activity of firms, and the various economic factors 
that may explain innovative activity and output in different countries. 
Porter’s strictly economic approach to NIS is different from that of Nelson (1993). In 
his book containing national case studies of the innovation systems of fifteen different 
countries, Nelson divided them into three groups: large high-income, smaller high-
income and lower-income countries. In the concluding chapter, Nelson (1993, p.518) 
argues that “it is inevitable that analysis of innovation in a country sometimes would get 
drawn into discussion of labor markets, financial systems, monetary fiscal and trade 
policies, and so on. One cannot draw a line neatly around those aspects of a nation’s 
institutional structure that are concerned predominantly with innovation in a narrow 
sense excluding everything else, and still tell a coherent story about innovation in a 
broad sense”. The fundamental difficulty for these applied studies is precisely the one 
stressed in the above quotation. It is rather difficult to define neatly which aspects to 
include or to exclude from the study of an innovation system, as private and public 
organizations interact within a complex institutional and economic structure. Empirical 
research has then proceeded in a broad and open way, given that it is hard to find 
universal and standard criteria to measure and compare the performance of innovation 
systems in different countries. 
The difficulties encountered by applied research suggest that a more structured 
theoretical framework may be useful for the development of the approach. Closely 
related to Nelson and Winter-like evolutionary tradition, theoretical research in the NIS 
field started with the book National Systems of Innovation: Towards a Theory of 
Innovation and Interactive Learning (Lundvall, 1992), which studied the 
microeconomic foundations of the innovative process from an evolutionary and 
systemic perspective. Innovation is a complex phenomenon of a dynamic, cumulative 
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and rather uncertain nature. It is important to consider such complexities not just from 
the point of view of the single individual or firm, but rather by focussing on the 
feedbacks and interactions between the various components of the system. Innovations 
and learning are collective phenomena, they can hardly be understood without an 
investigation of the complex interactions between heterogeneous economic agents. 
A useful distinction in the systemic theory of innovation is that between ‘learning’ and 
‘exploring’. Learning is a fundamental and ubiqutous characteristic of modern 
knowledge-based economies. It is, first of all, the outgrowth of the productive process, 
because individuals learn ‘by doing’ things (Arrow, 1962) and ‘by using’ technologies 
(Rosenberg, 1982). But economic agents also learn ‘by interacting’ with other agents 
(Lundvall, 1992). While learning is mainly an automatic and unaware consequence of 
the working activities of individuals, ‘exploring’ denotes a deliberate and active effort 
to search for new technical and organizational solutions, new products and processes. 
Typically, it is the R&D system, and more generally the science and technology system, 
to perform such an exploring activity in a systematic way. The main economic actors 
involved in this process are R&D professional laboratories in private firms, and research 
institutes and Universities in the public domain.  
Private and public organizations in the science and technology system, however, are not 
enough to define an innovation system, as there are important macro aspects that need 
to be considered as well. In fact, any form of learning and exploring is “anchored in the 
production structure and in the linkage pattern of the system of production” (Lundvall, 
1992, p.17). So, an innovation system approach studies scientific and technological 
activities within the whole productive system, in which learning continuously takes 
place. In this respect, there are several factors that directly or indirectly affect the 
innovative process: the education and training system in private firms and public 
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schools, the role of government in innovation and industrial policies, the general 
macroeconomic conditions, and consumers’ tastes and competencies. This suggests an 
interesting link in the NIS framework between the micro and the macroeconomic levels 
of analysis. The innovative behavior of individuals and firms is affected by 
macroeconomic and structural characteristics, and in turn the patterns of innovative 
activity determine the evolution of those aggregate features over time. 
This implicit interaction between the micro and the macro levels of analysis within an 
innovation system is not only considered from a strictly economic point of view, but 
also from an institutional one. Institutions are conceived in a broad way as “sets of 
common habits, routines, established practices, rules or laws that regulate the relations 
and interactions between individuals and groups” (Edquist and Johnson, 1997, p.46). 
They differ from organizations, which are consciously created and have an explicit 
purpose. Institutions can be thought of as ‘rules of the game’, while organizations are 
regarded as ‘players’. The fundamental importance of institutions in the innovative 
process is related to the fact that individuals are not rational agents, but follow habits of 
thought. Economic agents do not properly choose what to do, as it is the case in 
neoclassical microeconomic theory, but rather follow predetermined rules, routines, 
habits of thought. When these habits are “common to the generality of men” (Veblen, 
1919, p.239), they become ‘institutions’. It follows that any kind of human knowledge 
and innovation is accumulated and stored through habits of thought, routines and 
institutions. Cognitive, learning and innovative processes at the microeconomic level 
are shaped by institutions and social structures; in turn, the aggregate level of analysis is 
continuously affected by individuals’ innovative and learning processes, which tend to 
modify the previously adopted patterns of behavior and habits of thought. 
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According to this view, institutions have an important function to perform in innovation 
systems, in that they help economic agents to reduce the uncertainty and complexity of 
the innovative process. Institutions have a stable character, which sustains and enables 
individual learning and incremental innovations. At the same time, however, in periods 
of rapid and radical technological change, there is a pressure for the old habits of 
thought, routines and institutions to modify and to adapt to the emerging technological 
paradigm. In such circumstances, some creative destruction of knowledge and 
institutions is necessary, so that forgetting may be as important as learning (Johnson, 
1992). Countries with a higher social and institutional adaptability are more likely to 
enter quickly into a new techno-economic paradigm, and to have positive economic 
performance for a prolonged period of time, as shown by the case of Japan (Freeman, 
1987). 
However, although the role of institutions and their relationship with the innovative 
process is increasingly pointed out in the NIS approach, it must be recognised that the 
systemic analysis of institutional transformations is still much less developed than the 
corresponding analysis of technological change. The main focus of the research has so 
far predominantly been on the role of innovative activities performed by private and 
public organizations. 
  
3.4.1 Discussion 
In general system theory, a system is composed by its components and the relationships 
between them (Edquist, 2005). What gives an evolutionary flavour to the NIS approach, 
therefore, is not the use of system theory per se, but rather the way in which the 
components and their relationships are represented. This is discussed as follows. 
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As regards the relations between micro actors and macro structure, the NIS framework 
presents an explicit attempt to find a compromise between the two opposite views of 
methodological individualism and methodological holism. In a non-reductionist fashion, 
both levels of analysis, micro and macro, are studied in the framework. The innovative 
activity of private and public organizations is affected and shaped by the production 
structure, the macroeconomic conditions and the socio-institutional system of the 
country; in turn, national patterns of innovation and productivity growth are determined 
by the learning and searching activities of (micro) economic agents. The study of the 
interactions between micro actors and social structure may constitute an important 
contribution of the NIS framework to the development of evolutionary growth 
theorizing. Important insights in this respect could come from a rediscovery of the work 
of Veblen and old American institutionalism, based on the dynamic relationships 
between ‘habits of thought’ and ‘institutions’ (Hodgson, 1993 and 1998). Such a non-
reductionist link between micro and macro levels of the analysis, however, has not been 
made explicit yet in NIS studies, and needs to be further investigated in future research. 
Focusing the attention on the microfoundations of the NIS framework, a fundamental 
characteristic is the heterogeneity and variety of individuals and organizations 
(McKelvey, 1997; Saviotti, 1997). If all economic agents had the same learning and 
innovative capabilities, in fact, innovation could be studied by simply analysing the 
behavior of a representative agent, and there would be no need of a systemic 
perspective. But great complexities arise because learning and innovation are interactive 
activities carried out by heterogeneous agents. NIS is therefore implicitly based on 
population thinking. 
Technical and organizational changes are the result of the complex interactions between 
private and public organizations, consumers and users of new technologies, 
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macroeconomic structure and institutional framework. Innovation partly depends on 
learning processes (an inherent consequence of the production process), and partly on 
exploring activities (a deliberate effort to search for new technical solutions performed 
by the science and technology system). Therefore, the NIS theory of innovation points 
to the role played by both, radical and incremental innovations. It presents an 
explanation of technical and organizational changes that combines the neo-
Schumpeterian focus on radical innovations with the evolutionary microfounded theory 
based on learning and incremental changes.  
Consequently, the dynamics of the economic process driven by innovation is in 
principle consistent with both, a saltationist dynamics as in neo-Schumpeterian and 
technology-gap approaches, and the more gradualist view typical of Nelson and Winter-
like evolutionary studies. Nevertheless, most empirical research has so far focused on 
the static characteristics of the innovation system in a given period, not on its process of 
change over time. The analytical-theoretical explanation of the process of evolution of 
the system over time has not been made explicit yet in the NIS framework. The study of 
‘complex evolving system’ could constitute, according to Metcalfe (2001), a way to 
give a more precise evolutionary foundation to the NIS approach, and to investigate the 
dynamic properties of evolving national systems in a more rigorous way.  
What is clear is that, similarly to the other strands of research within evolutionary 
economics, economic change is conceived as a non-deterministic and non-predictable 
process. The fundamental and permanent source of uncertainty and unpredictability is 
constituted by the complexities of the innovative process and by the nature of 
interactive learning between heterogeneous individuals. Relatedly, as in all the other 
evolutionary perspectives considered so far, it is also clear that the evolution of the 
 40
innovation system does not tend towards equilibrium, but it is assumed to be a never-
ending and always changing process. 
 
 
4. New growth theory 
This section shifts the focus to the other major paradigm in modern theorizing on 
innovation and growth, namely new growth theory (NGT). The first part of the section 
describes the main types of analytical models developed in the field in the last two 
decades, while the second part points to the major strands of applied research related to 
NGT. There exist already comprehensive overviews of this literature, in relation to both 
NGT analytical models (Aghion and Howitt, 1998; Chui et al., 2002) and the related 
applied work (Temple, 1999; Islam, 2003). The reader is referred to these previous 
works for a more complete discussion of the technical issues involved, and for a more 
in-depth assessment of the advances obtained in this field.15 The present section, on the 
contrary, does not aim at providing a complete survey of NGT. The major purpose here 
will be to prepare the ground for the discussion of the theoretical foundations of NGT, 
which will be carried out in the final part of the section. The discussion will analyse the 
theoretical foundations of NGT by discussing the six major questions that this paper 
uses as framework of analysis, and this will make it possible to point out the great 
differences existing between NGT and the evolutionary economic paradigm. 
 
4.1 New growth models 
New Growth Theory models originated in the second half of the 1980s to overcome the 
problems left unresolved by the neoclassical model of economic growth (Solow, 1956). 
Two were the main sources of criticism made to the Solovian view. First, under the 
 41
assumptions of constant returns to scale of each factor in the production function, and of 
decreasing marginal productivity of capital over time, the Solow model predicted that 
economic growth would have ceased in the long run. The only possible source of 
permanent growth in the steady state was technological change, which was exogenous 
and unexplained by the model. The latter was then unable to explain why GDP per 
capita has been continuously growing in most industrialized countries since the 
Industrial Revolution. Second, as technology was assumed to be a public good, freely 
available to all countries, the model predicted that poor and rich countries would have 
all converged to the same level and rate of growth of GDP per capita in the long run 
(given population and saving rates). This prediction was in contrast with the empirical 
evidence on the persistence of growth rates differences over long periods of time. 
Taking these two problems into account, NGT models developed with the purpose of 
explaining how technological change can generate sustained growth and persistent 
differences between countries in the long run. The first generation of models was 
pionereed by Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988). Their models suggest that technological 
knowledge may be conceived as a non-rival good. This means that once new knowledge 
is produced by a firm (or by an economic agent who is accumulating human capital) this 
may benefit all the other firms as well. The public good characteristic of innovation 
introduces an important externality in the economic system, and consequently it may 
explain the existence of increasing returrns to scale in the aggregate production 
function. Differently from the Solow model, an increase in inputs of production can 
now have a permanent effect on the rate of growth of output, not only on its level. In the 
new framework, then, a positive growth rate in the long run can be explained by 
endogenous technical change, i.e. by the fact that there exist externalities associated to 
the production of technological knowledge by economic agents.16 Moreover, an 
 42
important implication of these models is that endogenous technological change and 
increasing returns in the aggregate production function may determine persistent 
differences in economic growth rates between countries, and so tackle the second 
question left unresolved by the Solovian model. The main problem associated with the 
first generation of NGT models, however, was that the reason why economic agents  
may decide to invest in the accumulation of knowledge and human capital was not made 
explicit. If knowledge is a purely public good, in fact, where do individuals and firms 
take the incentive to invest in the accumulation of these resources? 
This question was considered by a second generation of models (Romer, 1990; 
Grossman and Helpman, 1990). Still based on the idea that there are important 
externalities associated to the public good features of knowledge, these models argue 
that knowledge is an (at least partly) appropriable good, meaning that the fruits of 
technical progress may be appropriated by the producer in the form of monopoly rents. 
This idea is formalized by assuming that innovation is created by a separate research 
sector, whose purpose is to create new blueprints for the production of intermediate 
capital goods. Once a new blueprint is found, the producer firm can appropriate its 
invention by patenting it, so that it becomes a monopolist in the production of the new 
capital good. As a consequence, the assumption of perfect competition is released, as 
the intermediate goods sector is characterized by monopolistic competition. These 
models also assume that once a new capital good is produced, it adds to the older ones, 
which are not instantaneously driven out of the market. Economic growth, then, takes 
the form of an increasing variety of intermediate goods.  
In a nutshell, the appropriability character of technological knowledge explains the 
microeconomic incentive to invest in innovative activities, and its nonrival feature 
explains aggregate increasing returns, endogenous growth and differences between 
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countries, as in the previous generation of models. The Romer (1990) and Grossman 
and Helpman (1990) version of NGT, however, opens up an additional question: is it 
appropriate to model innovation as a deterministic and certain outcome of the activity of 
the research sector?  
A third generation of NGT models, originating from the works of Aghion and Howitt 
(1992) and Grossman and Helpman (1991), proposed an answer to this question by 
pointing to the uncertain nature of innovative activity. Analytical models formalize the 
uncertainty characterizing the innovative process by assuming that new blueprints are 
found according to a Poisson stochastic process, whose parameter represents the 
productivity in the research sector. As the parameter of the stochastic process is known, 
it is possible to calculate an average arrival rate of innovation, and consequently an 
average rate of growth of the economy. The second modification introduced by this 
class of models is that they assume that each new blueprint makes the previous ones 
instantaneously obsolete, so that the previous monopolists in the intermediate good 
sector are driven out of the market as soon as an innovation is found. These models drop 
the idea that there is an increasing variety of coexisting capital goods, and point out that 
the process of technological competition and economic growth are characterized by 
Schumpeterian ‘creative destruction’ (or ‘business stealing effect’): the monopoly 
power associated to a new bluprint is only temporary, and once a new intermediate 
capital good is introduced, the previous monopolists are driven out of the market.  
Combining stochastic innovative activity, creative destruction and aggregate increasing 
returns, these models predict that economic growth in the long run is a function of three 
major factors: the amount of labour resources employed in the research sector, the 
degree of market power in the intermediate capital goods sector, and the productivity in 
the research sector.  
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An important empirical fact that these previous generations of endogeneous growth 
models did not consider is the observation that innovations may have different sizes 
with different impacts on the economy. The distinction between radical and incremental 
innovations is an important one in evolutionary economics, and it was originally pointed 
out in the neo-Schumpeterian long wave strand of research. How can this empirical fact 
be represented in NGT models? How does the size of innovation matter for 
endogeneous growth theory? 
It is the most recent generation of NGT models (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995; 
Helpman, 1998) to put forward an answer to these questions. These works emphasize 
that innovations may have different sizes: they can be drastic (radical) or incremental. 
Some drastic innovations, in particular, may have deep impacts on the process of 
economic growth. According to Helpman (1998, p.13), “a drastic innovation qualifies as 
a ‘general purpose technology’ if it has the potential for pervasive use in a wide range of 
sectors in ways that drastically change their modes of operation”. From this definition, it 
appears that the concept of ‘general purpose technologies’ (GPTs) is quite similar to 
that of ‘technological paradigm’ (Dosi, 1982; Freeman, 1982), which we have 
previously presented with reference to the neo-Schumpeterian long wave theory (see 
section 3.1). 
In this recent class of NGT models, once a new GPT arrives the radical innovation is 
not immediately ready to be used in the final goods sector, but it needs to be 
implemented in the form of a new intermediate capital good (incremental innovation). 
The arrival of the latter is formalized as a Poisson-distributed random variable, as in the 
previous Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman and Helpman (1991) models.  
After the introduction of the new GPT, labour resources are transferred to the research 
sector in order to develop the new capital goods and to appropriate the relative 
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monopoly rents, in a phase in which the old technological paradigm still presents higher 
productivity than the new one. At the aggregate level, this first phase results in a slump 
of economic activity that may last for a few decades. Later on, once a certain number of 
intermediate goods embodying the new GPT are found, the profitability of the new 
methods of production turns out to be more evident to the firms in the final goods 
sector, and the GPT becomes the new dominant technological paradigm. In this second 
phase, the new GPT diffuses to the whole economy, and this may sustain the growth of 
aggregate productivity for the following decades. This two-phase cycle of growth is 
assumed to repeat over time, and in the long run such a cyclical trend tends towards the 
steady state.  
The stylized description presented above clearly indicates that GPT models propose a 
formalization of the Schumpeterian theory of long waves. This is an interesting attempt, 
but modeling exercises of this type should in the future address some major questions: 
(i) Why does the GPT arrive at a given point in time? Is there any economic or socio-
institutional factor affecting the invention of new GPTs? (ii) Is there any economic or 
socio-institutional factor affecting the rate of diffusion of the new technological 
paradigm over time and in different countries? These questions suggest possible 
avenues for future research in this field, and open up a possible ground for further 
interactions between the evolutionary long wave theory and the GPT modeling tradition. 
 
4.2 NGT applied research  
The development of new growth models has attracted a great deal of interest of 
empirically oriented scholars, and a huge amount of applied studies on cross-country 
differences in economic growth has flourished in the last fifteen years. These works 
typically take the form of cross-section econometric regressions where the growth of 
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GDP per capita over time is regressed on its level at the beginning of the period (a 
proxy for the scope for catching up), and on a set of other structural and economic 
characteristics, such as, for instance, countries’ accumulation of physical capital, and 
levels of education and human capital.  
The so-called convergence debate refers to the two different approaches and 
interpretations that this type of study may lead to (Temple, 1999; Islam, 2003). One set 
of econometric works derives growth regressions in the context of the Solow model 
augmented with human capital (e.g. Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992). The convergence 
property is then interpreted, in a neoclassical fashion, as a result of decreasing marginal 
product of physical and human capital. Another stream of cross-country applied 
research, on the contrary, includes additional variables in the specification, such as 
political conditions, industrial structure, and so on, and interprets the conditional 
convergence result (or lack of such) in a NGT framework, i.e. as an indication of 
persistent growth rate differences across countries (e.g. Barro, 1991; Barro and Sala y 
Martin, 1995). Here, conditional convergence does not depend on different rates of 
accumulation of physical capital, but rather on the advantages that the international 
diffusion of technologies may determine for catching up countries. 
An important result in the growth regressions literature, though, is that convergence is 
not a ubiquitous phenomenon, but it depends to a great extent on the countries included 
in the sample under study. In a seminal paper, Baumol (1986) pointed out the existence 
of three different convergence clubs in the world economy (OECD countries, centrally 
planned economies, and less developed countries), and demonstrated that the patterns of 
convergence greatly differ between these groups. Baumol’s idea has been refined in a 
number of subsequent empirical studies (De Long, 1988; Baumol and Wolff, 1988; 
Baumol et al., 1989; Baumol, 1994), which have all stressed the great variety of 
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macroeconomic performance in the world economy, and the striking differences 
between the rapid growth of a restricted group of advanced economies and the static 
patterns of less developed countries (Pritchett, 1997).  
A well-known paper by Durlauf and Johnson (1995) developed this idea further, and 
classified world countries into four groups according to their initial conditions (i.e. 
initial levels of GDP per capita and of literacy rate). Their empirical study confirmed 
the existence of different convergence clubs with markedly different characteristics and 
growth behaviour. Instead of using the common cross-country regression framework, 
Quah (1996a; 1996b; 1996c; 1997) studied the dynamics of the distribution of world 
income, and found evidence of “emerging twin peaks”, i.e. the existence of polarization 
and of increasing differences between rich and poor countries. 
These applied works are all the more important in growth theory because, as observed 
by Temple (1999, p. 150), it is “useful to draw distinctions between types of country. 
[…] It is important to move away from characterizing the ‘average’ developing country, 
and work towards a deeper understanding of differences.” It is thus increasingly felt in 
growth theory “the need to acknowledge heterogeneity, and move away from techniques 
based on ‘representative’ economies” (ibid., p. 150).  
The important challenge that this strand of econometric studies presents for future 
research in the field is twofold. First, it shows that a wide array of different econometric 
methodologies may be used to shed new light on the issue of growth rate differences 
and to complement the traditional cross-sectional approach: panel data methods (Islam, 
1995), regression trees and other clustering techniques (Durlauf and Johnson, 1995), 
and techniques for analysing the dynamics of the whole distribution of world income 
(Quah, 1996a). Secondly, it suggests the need for further modelling efforts to provide a 
theoretical explanation for the empirical findings of convergence clubs, polarization and 
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twin peaks. One possible direction would be to extend the multiple equilibria type of 
models (e.g. Azariadis and Drazen, 1990; Galor, 1996), although the link between this 
class of model and the NGT empirical work has not been made explicit yet. 
One major criticism often made to the new growth empirics is that the various 
econometric studies are tests of conditional convergence on a large sample of countries, 
and not of innovation-driven endogenous growth for each single country belonging to 
the sample (Fine, 2000). They are not estimation of the structural form of the analytical 
NGT models, but rather tests of its reduced form. As Paul Romer (1994, p.11) argues, 
“the convergence controversy […] represents a digression from the main story behind 
endogenous growth theory”, and not a direct test of it. 
Sharing this point of view, Jones (1995a; 1995b) shifts the attention to the time series 
implications of new growth models, so originating a new class of empirical tests more 
directly aimed at testing the predictions of the endogenous formalizations. As 
mentioned above, NGT models predict a positive relationship between the amount of 
labour resources employed in the research sector and the rate of economic growth. Jones 
shows, however, that this prediction is in contrast with the empirical evidence, which 
indicates that the steady rise of R&D intensity since the 1960s has not been associated 
to increasing but to constant or decreasing economic growth rates.  
This finding has recently inspired a new type of empirical tests of NGT models, which 
focuses on the time series dimension of the growth process, and on the ‘scale effects’ 
implications of the analytical models (Jones, 1999; Greiner, Semmler and Gong, 2005). 
This new direction of research is promising, although various methodological and data-
related problems may hamper the diffusion of this type of time series tests (Temple, 
1999 and 2003; Islam, 2003). An interesting connection that would enrich even further 
this line of empirical research could be the one between time series endogenous tests 
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and the recent class of GPT models, investigating the empirical relevance of the two-
phases long wave cycle generated by the emergence of a new GPT.  
 
4.3 Discussion 
NGT models and the related empirical works are based on the concept of aggregate 
production function, meaning that the approach is macroeconomic but implicitly 
microfounded. Economic agents are represented as rational maximizers of an 
intertemporal profit or utility function. Moreover, they are conceived as fundamentally 
homogenous. The use of the ‘representative agent’ metaphor makes it possible to study 
the effects of the microeconomic behaviour on the macroeconomic level of analysis by 
using relatively simple analytical and formal models. The approach is thus based on 
typological thinking, which implies a less realistic description but a greater analytical 
power of NGT models as compared to evolutionary studies.  
When NGT models formalize the ideas of ‘variety of capital goods’ and ‘product 
differentiation’ (Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1990), these are rather different 
from the way in which heterogeneity and variety are conceived in evolutionary 
economics. In NGT, variety is a consequence of innovative and learning activities of 
economic agents (reminding somewhat of the ‘increasing complexity’ of the growth 
process described by Adam Smith and Herbert Spencer), not an essential precondition 
of the process of economic growth (as in evolutionary economics).  
In NGT models, innovation is a major source of economic growth. Technological 
knowledge is formalized as a non-rival and partly appropriable economic good 
produced by a separate research sector. Innovation may be explained by two kinds of 
complementary mechanisms: learning by doing in relation to the accumulation of 
knowledge and human capital (emphasized by Romer, 1986 and Lucas, 1988), and 
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‘exploring’ through the R&D activity of private firms (emphasized since the model of 
Romer, 1990). More recently, GPT models enlarge the set of possible mechanisms 
explaining technological innovation and productivity growth by assuming that radical 
innovations may have particularly deep and pervasive impacts on the economy. At the 
present stage of development of these models, however, the arrival of a new GPT is 
exogenous, serendipitous, and not linked to any economic or socio-institutional factor. 
A field for further modeling exercises would be to endogeneize the arrival of radical 
innovations by following some of the insights coming from the neo-Schumpeterian long 
wave literature (Freeman et al., 1982; Freeman and Louca, 2001; see section 3.1). An 
interesting possibility, in particular, would be to model the ‘depression-trigger 
hypothesis’ by linking the rate of arrival of radical innovations to economic factors such 
as demand and profitability conditions in the downswing phase of the long wave cycle. 
Learning by doing and exploring activities by the R&D sector determine a gradualist 
type of dynamics, following which the economic system smoothly proceeds towards the 
steady state. History, then, may be conceived as a uniform-speed transitional dynamics, 
rather than an evolutionary process of transformation and qualitative change. Such a 
gradualist view, however, may be modified in the future by the advances of the recent 
generation of GPT models. In this case, innovations are mainly radical and may 
determine saltationist dynamics and long run fluctuations. The temptative combination 
of gradualist and saltationist dynamics in GPT models appears to be a novel element in 
NGTs, and needs to be further explored in the future.  
Another important theoretical feature of NGT models is the way in which uncertainty is 
introduced in modeling exercises. These, in fact, represent innovation as an uncertain 
outcome of R&D activities by assuming that its arrival rate follows a Poisson stochastic 
process with given parameter. This formalization suggests that the process of growth is 
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not characterized by ‘strong’ and radical uncertainty as in evolutionary economics 
(Dosi, 1982), but rather by ‘computable risk’. In fact, although a stochastic element 
exists in the model, it is still possible to predict on average the rate of arrival of 
innovations, and consequently that of economic growth. The recent class of GPT 
models does not constitute an exception in this respect: the two-phase cycle repeats 
mechanically over time, and no strong uncertainty is present in the succession of the 
deterministic and predictable long waves. The way in which uncertainty is represented 
in NGT models implies a stylized description of the growth process, but its advantage is 
certainly the greater tractability and stronger analytical power of NGT models as 
compared to evolutionary works. In an emerging class of models of economic 
dynamics, namely chaos models, a deterministic system may, due to the high sensitivity 
in initial conditions, generate radically uncertain outcomes (Boldrin and Woodford, 
1990; George and Oxley, 1999). This type of models presents a peculiar combination of 
neoclassical characteristics (the description and microfoundations of the deterministic 
system) and evolutionary outcomes (uncertain and disequilibrium behaviour). This class 
of models has not been applied yet to the study of innovation and growth, but its wider 
use in future modeling and empirical exercises may possibly constitute a bridge between 
the evolutionary and NGT research traditions. 
Finally, the economic process represented by NGT, in formal models as well as in 
empirical works, tends towards a steady state of balanced growth, which may differ 
across countries. Differently from evolutionary economics, the impact of innovation on 
economic growth is therefore analysed in a dynamic equilibrium setting. In GPT models 
too, the economic fluctuations determined by the stochastic arrival of innovations do not 
permanently deviate from the long run equilibrium trend. Temple (2003) has recently 
argued, however, that the steady state metaphor should not be taken too literally by 
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growth researchers, as its major purpose is to provide an analytical tool for the 
tractability of formal models, and not a prediction to be tested by empirical studies. Yet 
another challenge for future research, then, would be to shift the focus from the long run 
properties of the growth models towards the process of transitional dynamics, which is 
all the more important in terms of welfare and policy implications (George, Oxley and 
Carlaw, 2004). 
 
 
Table 1. The theoretical foundations of evolutionary and new growth theories.  
 
 
 New Growth Theories Evolutionary theories 
What is the main level 
 of aggregation? 
Aggregate models based 
on neoclassical microfoundations 
(‘methodological individualism’) 
Towards a co-evolution between 
 micro and macro levels of analysis 
(‘non-reductionism’) 
Representative agent or 
heterogeneous individuals? 
 
Representative agent and  
typological thinking 
 
Heterogeneous agents and 
 population thinking 
What is the mechanism of 
creation of innovation? 
Learning by doing and ‘searching’ 
activity by the R&D sector; 
Radical innovations and GPTs 
Combination of various forms of 
learning with radical technical and 
organizational innovations  
What is the dynamics of the 
growth process? 
 How is history conceived? 
History is a uniform-speed 
transitional dynamics 
Towards a combination of gradualist 
and saltationist dynamics: 
 history is a process of qualitative 
change and transformation 
Is the growth process 
deterministic or unpredictable? 
‘Weak uncertainty’ 
 (computable risk): stochastic 
 but predictable process 
‘Strong’ uncertainty: 
non deterministic and  
unpredictable process 
Towards equilibrium  
or never ending? 
Towards the  
steady state 
Never ending and  
ever changing 
 
 
 
 
 
 53
5. Conclusions 
The article has presented a critical survey of two major modern approaches to the study 
of innovation and economic growth, evolutionary and new growth theories. The purpose 
has been to discuss the often made claim that the two approaches, both inspired by 
Schumpeter’s seminal works, are becoming more and more similar in terms of the 
sources and mechanisms of the growth process on which they focus. According to this 
argument, some kind of theoretical convergence between the two paradigms is taking 
place.  
The article has argued that a comprehensive comparison of these different growth 
theories cannot simply be done by pointing to their common Schumpeterian features, as 
it is frequently done, or by looking at the properties and results of modeling exercises. 
The comparison needs to be made at a more general level of analysis, that is by 
investigating the theoretical foundations of the different approaches. By theoretical 
foundations we mean the theoretical characteristics that may be considered as the main 
building blocks of each growth paradigm.  
Following this idea, section 2 has presented the six theoretical questions that we have 
used as a framework to compare the two approaches. It has defined the main concepts 
used in the survey, and it has briefly pointed to the origin of each concept in the history 
of economic thought. Section 3 has analysed the basic foundations of different streams 
of modern evolutionary economics, namely the neo-Schumpeterian long wave theory, 
the technology-gap approach, Nelson and Winter-like evolutionary theorizing, and the 
national innovation systems framework. The section has shown that these recent streams 
of evolutionary economics share the same theoretical foundations, so that they can be 
regarded as different strands of research within the same (broadly defined) evolutionary 
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paradigm. However, the discussion has also pointed to some existing tensions and to the 
great challenges ahead for the evolutionary economic paradigm. 
Section 4 has turned the attention to new growth theory, and it has briefly discussed the 
main generations of analytical models, as well as the major developments in the applied 
tradition. The section has shown that the theoretical foundations of new growth theory 
greatly differ from those of the evolutionary approach. The main differences between 
the two growth paradigms can be summarized as follows (see table 1). 
 
(1) The aggregate properties of new growth models are derived from the analysis of the 
behaviour of rational economic agents, and the related cross-country econometric work 
is set up in a production function framework. Both of them are thus implicitly based on 
methodological individualism. On the contrary, evolutionary studies point to the 
theoretical advantages of a non-reductionist theory where the micro and macro levels of 
analysis co-evolve and interact with each other. This attempt is often called for, but it is 
nonetheless difficult to make operational, and the different strands of evolutionary 
research have not yet reached a clear and common position in this respect. 
(2) ‘Typological thinking’ and ‘representative agent’ are conceived as useful principles 
in new growth theory, as they increase the analytical tractability of formal models, thus 
strengthening their conceptual power. In NGTs, the notion of heterogeneity is not an 
essential intrinsic characteristic of individuals, firms, sectors and countries, but rather a 
consequence of the productive process, close in spirit to the metaphor of increasing 
complexity associated with the growth process described in the past by Adam Smith and 
Herbert Spencer. In evolutionary economics, on the other hand, heterogeneity of 
economic agents, routines and habits of thought assumes a fundamental role in the 
construction of the theory, which is then close to a Veblerian type of population 
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thinking. The latter increases the realism of the description of the growth process, but 
presents formidable challenges for modeling exercises. 
(3) Although innovation is the main source of economic growth in both equilibrium and 
evolutionary views, the underlying concept of knowledge is rather different. In new 
growth theory, knowledge is conceived as a non-rival and partly appropriable economic 
good. Evolutionary theories, though, point out that knowledge is a more complex entity, 
which cannot be analysed in purely economic terms. According to evolutionary scholars 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982), knowledge is often tacit, and not always codified and 
codifiable. It is embodied in the routines of individuals and organizations, and not 
stored in a book of blueprints. It is interactive, collective and systemic, and not simply 
the result of individual learning. It tends to be highly dependent and strongly rooted in a 
given organizational and institutional context, and not separable from it. On the whole, 
the mechanisms of creation of innovation look similar in evolutionary and new growth 
theories, but the conceptual foundation behind them is rather different.  
(4) NGT models conceive history as a uniform-speed transitional dynamics towards the 
steady state, not as a process of qualitative change and transformation. Evolutionary 
economics, on the contrary, searches for a combination of saltationist and gradualist 
dynamics, and stresses the role of qualitative change and permanent transformation of 
the growth process. In both paradigms, however, it is difficult to combine gradualist and 
saltationist features in a single theoretical framework, and this presents interesting 
challenges for future research. 
(5) The new growth world is characterized by ‘weak’ uncertainty and computable risk, 
as implied by the use of random variables to formalize the arrival of innovation in the 
analytical models. The growth process is hence stochastic but predictable. On the other 
hand, the evolutionary growth process unfolds in an economic environment marked by 
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‘strong’ uncertainty and unpredictability. This is clearly argued by a large set of 
appreciative and non-formal type of studies, while evolutionary modeling exercises do 
not significantly differ from new growth models in this particular respect. The tension 
between appreciative and formal types of evolutionary studies poses a crucial challenge 
for future developments of the evolutionary paradigm. 
(6) In NGTs, economic growth tends towards the steady state in the long run. The 
steady state metaphor, in this context, should be interpreted as a useful tool that 
increases the tractability and analytical power of formal models, rather than a prediction 
to be confronted with empirical evidence. The growth path described by evolutionary 
theories, on the contrary, is an ever changing and never ending process of change and 
transformation, much closer in spirit to the disequilibrium economic world theorized in 
the past by Veblen and Schumpeter.  
 
In a nutshell, new growth theory combines ideas from classical authors such as Smith 
and Schumpeter, and interpret them in a dynamic equilibrium framework, where 
rational choices of economic agents lead to steady state outcomes in a stochastic way. 
Evolutionary economics draws inspiration from various classical authors, such as Marx, 
Veblen and Schumpeter, and interpret their insights in an evolutionary disequilibrium 
context, where interactions among routine-guided and boundedly rational heterogeneous 
agents determine an unpredictable and endless process of qualitative change and 
transformation. The former paradigm points to the advantages that formal modelling 
may lead to in terms of increased analytical simplicity and greater power of 
generalization. The latter stresses the new insights that a more realistic description of 
the growth process makes it possible to obtain. 
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On this ground, the often-claimed convergence between evolutionary and new growth 
theories cannot be simply justified in terms of their common Schumpeterian features. 
The analysis carried out in this paper leads to the conclusion that evolutionary and new 
growth theories greatly differ with respect to all of their theoretical foundations. No 
theoretical convergence between the two paradigms is taking place. 
This finding should be welcomed by both evolutionary and new growth scholars, as it is 
not theoretical convergence that determines advances in growth theory, but rather the 
continuous process of interaction and give-and-take between the two paradigms. 
Although no theoretical convergence is taking place, in fact, there exists an intense 
exchange of ideas and a fruitful interaction between the two approaches. On the one 
hand, evolutionary economics greatly benefits from the development of NGTs. The 
unsatisfaction with the stylized and formal type of analysis of the development process 
offered by endogenous growth models has proved to be a fundamental motivation to 
induce evolutionary economists to provide more realistic descriptions and to search for 
new empirical insights.  
On the other hand, new growth theories benefit from the development of evolutionary 
economics, as the latter provides new insights on the complexities associated with the 
innovative process and its impacts on economic performance. The re-interpretation of 
some of these evolutionary insights in a dynamic equilibrium framework has in fact led 
to the refinement of NGT models and to new empirical applications. Three specific 
examples may illustrate this point. The first refers to the evolutionary strand of long 
wave theory flourished in the 1980s (section 3.1). This type of historical and descriptive 
research has later been formalized by the recent class of GPTs models, where the 
evolutionary insights on radical innovations, technological paradigms and 
Schumpeterian long waves have been re-interpreted in an endogenous growth 
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framework. The second example relates to the technology-gap approach (section 3.2). 
These type of empirical studies, flourished during the 1980s, were originally quite close 
to an evolutionary and disequilibrium interpretation of the growth process. But a later 
strand of econometric work in NGT applied a similar idea on the relevance of 
innovation and the international diffusion of new technologies, and interpreted it in the 
context of a micro-founded dynamic equilibrium setting. Finally, a third type of 
interaction between the two paradigms refers to the idea of variety of macroeconomic 
behaviour. While this has been a major point motivating evolutionary research since its 
outset (e.g. in the literature on national systems of innovation, see section 3.4), 
mainstream growth theory did not initially acknowledge this as a major point for 
building up analytical models and untertaking empirical research. In the last decade, 
however, NGT has increasingly focused on the great variety of growth behaviour in the 
world economy, and investigated the existence of different convergence clubs through 
multiple equilibria models as well as a wide array of non-parametric econometric 
techniques.  
In all these examples, the insights provided by evolutionary research have proved to be 
a crucial motivation to develop successive waves of new growth models, where the 
latter have re-interpreted the evolutionary insights in a mainstream dynamic equilibrium 
framework based on neoclassical microfoundations. The outcomes of these NGT 
models reproduce the same stylized facts pointed out by evolutionary studies, but, 
admittedly, the theoretical structure underpinning them is fundamentally different from 
the conceptual framework originally proposed by evolutionary theories. So, the cases 
mentioned above do not represent examples of theoretical convergence between the two 
paradigms, but they rather indicate the existence of interactions between radically 
different economic worlds.  
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The interactions between these alternative paradigms have been quite important for the 
development of the field in the last two decades, and they will go on playing a relevant 
role in the future. The crucial point is that such fruitful exchange of ideas between 
evolutionary and new growth theories takes place precisely because the two approaches 
are so different. Therefore, it is the inherent difference between the two that stimulates 
advances in growth theory, not their convergence to a common paradigm. The day in 
which different paradigms will have converged to a single framework, growth theory 
will cease to be such a dynamic and fascinating field of research. This day is still distant 
in the future. 
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Notes 
 
1. Following Witt (1991), Nelson (1995), and Fagerberg (2003), we will use the label ‘evolutionary 
economics’ to indicate the whole set of approaches that will be discussed in section 3. Section 3.3, 
however, will focus on the more narrow set of evolutionary approaches directly linked to Nelson and 
Winter (1982)’s influential theory of economic change, that we will label ‘Nelson and Winter-like 
evolutionary theorizing’. 
2. There are some other important disequilibrium views (such as the Austrian School, Post-Keynesian, 
and Institutional economics) that are indirectly related to the development of modern evolutionary 
economics, but lay outside of the scope of this survey, so that they will not be considered further.  
3. A more detailed discussion of the relevance of different levels of aggregation in economic theory   
can be found in Hodgson (1993, ch.15). 
4. It is well known that Schumpeter was the first to use the expression ‘methodological individualism’. 
5. See Swedberg and Granovetter (1992). 
6. See also Hodgson (1998). 
7. An extended discussion of the concept of ‘population thinking’ can be found in Andersen (1994) and 
Hodgson (1993). 
8. Freeman (1994) and Dosi (1997) present critical surveys of the different mechanisms of technical 
change in economic theory.  
9. A critical discussion of the role of technical change in the theory of Karl Marx can be found in Elster 
(1983) and Hodgson (1993). 
10. See Hodgson (1993, ch.14) for a critical discussion of this issue. The brief characterization of a 
mechanistic, deterministic and predictable economic process pointed out here is admittedly 
simplistic. There exists a class of models of economic dynamics, so-called chaos models (Boldrin 
and Woodford, 1990; George and Oxley, 1999), where a deterministic system, due to the high 
sensitivity in initial conditions, may lead to stochastic behaviour and uncertain outcomes. However, 
chaos models have not been widely applied yet to the study of innovation and growth, and a 
discussion of them goes therefore beyond the scope of this survey.  
11. The historically oriented literature on catching-up and growth has been recently surveyed by 
Fagerberg and Godinho (2005). 
12. Pavitt (2005) has recently considered some of the most important contributions in this now huge 
literature.  
13. An overview of the main findings of the recent studies of sectoral systems of innovation can be found 
in Malerba (2005).  
14. For a previous discussion of evolutionary models of economic growth, with special emphasis on 
diffusion models, see Sarkar (1998). 
15. Several comprehensive surveys related to NGT have recently been presented in this Journal, in 
relation to different aspects of growth theory, such as the role of trade for the growth process (Lewer 
and Van den Berg, 2003), the effects of inflation (Temple, 2000; Gillman and Keyak; 2005) and of 
financial liberalization (Auerbach and Siddiki, 2004), and the role of fiscal policies (Zagler and 
Durnecker, 2003). Measurement and empirical issues have also been discussed, particularly in 
relation to different measures of human capital (Wobmann, 2003; Gibson and Oxley, 2003) and of 
TFP (Carlaw and Lipsey, 2003). For a detailed discussion of these contributions, see George, Oxley 
and Carlaw (2004).   
16. New growth models are in fact also referred to as endogenous growth models, due to the endogenous 
nature of technological change. All the models reviewed in this section share this characteristic, as 
they all focus on innovation as the main engine of growth. However, there exist other classes of 
endogenous growth models that emphasize other sources of economic dynamics than technological 
change (see previous note). In this type of models, which we do not consider in this survey, it is the 
long run growth rate, rather than innovation, that constitutes the endogenous feature of the 
formalization. 
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